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No . 72-1188 ( ~ ~a:J'lJ~l) Reservists Comm, 
Unles }iy memory fails me, you have been spared during 
your first two terms on the Court any really hard standing 
cases . I think standing and justiciability are among the 
\JI~ ~ _:_:_:_:_t_:~:~ic;;:sd:~::i:::s::t:h::t:o:::~:i:::s::t::~:n:: a 
(J novel question of constitutional interpretation . Since 
(1) the standing issue raises an apparent conflict between 
'·~ 
.... .... 
this Court ' s opinion in Levitt and Judge Gesell ' s opinion , 
and (2) the justiciability issue was specifically left 
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Justice No • 7 2- 118 8 C FX 
RICHARDSON 
v. Federal Civil 
RESERVISTS COMMITTEE 
TO STOP THE WAR 
1. Art. I, Section 6, Cl. 2 of the Constitution 
provides thats 
No Senator or Representative shall, during the 
Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any 
civil Office under the Authority of the United States, 
which shall have been created, or the Emoluments 
whereof shall have been cncreased during such time; 
and no Person holding any Office under the UnitejL--
States, shall be a Mem~er of either House during ~ 
his Continuance in Office. 
C Plaintiffs, an association of present and former 
Reservists organized to oppose the war in Vietnam, and five 
individual members of that organization, sued in the capacities, 
alternatively, of Reservists, of persons opposed to the Vietnam 
War, as taxpayers, and as citizens, to enforce the ''incompatibility 
clause". They sought a declaratory judgment and injunction 
against the Sec'y of Defense and the Secretaries of the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force upon the undisputed showing that 117 -
JI 
Senators and Representatives hold co;nmissi.ons in the Army, 
~· Air Force or Marine Corps. Reserves. Plaintiff~respondents 
did not seek to remove any elected representatives from office, 
nor did they seek a declaration that any such representatives 
lack the qualifications for the Senau~ or House. Rather, they 
asked that the Executive Branch be directed to eliminate any 
office inconsistent constitutional mandate. 
The USDC, concluded in a long opini.on that 
respondents had standing to raise the claim, that the matter 
was justiciable, and that relief must be grJnted plaintiff-
respondents on the merits. Accordingly declaratory judgment 
was entered. Injunctive relief was denied. 
2. The USDC decision. The lJSDC concluded tfiat 
respondents had standing only as ordlnary citizens. The 
controversy was irrelevant in relation to resps' stature 
Reservists or citizens opposing the Vietnam War, in the court's 
view. Nor was resps' status as taxnay0rs sufficient, for 
----
the inco.£1l.pa ti bi li ty clause could not \w cons trued as a limi ta ti on 
on the taxing and spending power of COI18ress. Flast v. Cohen, 
392 U.S. 83. However, resps were ch}emr.d to have standing as 
(, . ' 
··-
citizens of the United States. The court recognized that in 
very few instances will undifferentiated citizens have 
standing. · owever, several factors led the court to beli.eve 
that this was one of those rare instances. --.... ____________________ __ 
/ 
First, while any injury which might result from 
Congressmen holding Reserve commissions is 
hypothetical, the hypothesis is not concocted by 
plaintiffs but underlies the constitutional 
provision itself. Like a conflict-of-interest 
statute, the constitutional bar addresses jtse]f 
to the otential for undue influence r t · 
to its rea 1zat1on. *** The Court will not lightly 
conclude that a constitutional provision so highly 
regarded and hotly debated by the Framers serves no 
real purpose. 
Second, the issue tendered i& a narrow one and 
involves a precise self-operative provision of the 
Constitution. This is not a case where plaintiffs 
seek "to employ a federal court a.s a forum in whi. ch 
to air [their] generalized grievances about the 
conduct of government or the allocation of power 
in the Federal System." Flast v. Coher1, st~Qra, at 106. 
Third, the interest in maintaining independence 
amon the br c1es of ovcrrunent is shared by all 
citizens equally, and since t11s is the primary 
if not the sole purpose of the bar against 
Congressmen holding executive office, the interest 
of plaintiffs as cttizens is undoubtedly one which 
was intended to be protected by the cons ti tut i onal 
provision involved. 
Finally, there can be no doubt that thi.s is a 
"case or controversy" in the common meaning of those 
words; the parties sharply conflict in both their 
interests and their views, and the case was ably 
briefed and argued. It is not irrelevant t~ 
1 not t if these laintiffs cannot 0BEa1n judicial ~t1 on 1en as a ac 1ca 
Relying on the wording of the clause and the original 
version of the clause as presented to the Convention, (the 
clause originally made members of either house "ineligible to 
and incapable c£ holding any office"), the government argued 
in the district court that the clause states only a qualification 
( 
for membershi p in Congress, not a qualification for executive 
office. Therefore, no cause of action can lie against these 
executive defendants to remove Congressmen from Rese rve offices; 
rather, the only remedy is to rem ove the Reserve officer from 
hi. s seat in Congress. Si.nee, under Art. I, § 5, each House i. s 
the "Judge of the Qualifications of its own Members", no remedy 
may be sought in any court, as review would be barred under 
the political question doctrine. The di.strict court researched 
the hi.story of the clause extens ively, and concluded that the 
portion here relevant -- the second part of the clause -- was 
not hotly contested, and its meaning was never questioned, the 
Clause was intended simply to d~clare the i.ncompati.bi.li.ty of 
a seat in Congress and an offi ce in the Executive or Judiciary. 
Two other factors led the court: to tl"w conclusion that a cause 
of action was stated here. First, the court could find no 
instance of Congressional enforccmr; ...-i t: of the clause against 
an elected Congressman who held Re se rv e office at the time 
he first entered Congress. [There have been instances when 
the clause was enforced against s0ate d Congressmen who thereafter 
accepted office while sti 11 in Con[,rc~.s s. J It is the settled 
rule that in the case of incompa t Lblc offices, "acceptance of 
the second office vacates the fi rs l.." 11.R. Rep. No. 885, 64th 
Cong. , 1st Ses s. , at 4 (1916). Sc c ::J ;;_d, from this settled rule, 
and from the executive power, the lJSDC considered it clear that 
the executive branch had the ri rs hr and power to remove Congressmen 
from the Reserve Offi_ces which thc>y ~10ld at the time of their 
election, and that their failur e, to do s o co 1 ld be judicially 
reviewed. [It is important to n ~tr that the USDC's judgment 
related only to "offices" held lJy Con r~rc~s smen at the time of 
their election.] 
( 
, ... . i' 
On the meri. ts, the USDC considered two questi.ons 1 
(1) the meaning and purpose of the clause; and (2) whether, 
under the clause, a commission i.n the Reserve is an "office 
under the United States~ Primary reliance was placed by the 
USDC on the proceedings of the Consti.tutional Convention and 
the Federalist Papers. 
(1) The original wording of the Clause was: 
The members of each House shall be ineligible to, 
and incapable of holding any office under the 
authority of the United States, during the time 
for which they shall respectively be elected; and 
the members of the Senate shall be ineligible to, 
and incapable of holding any such office for one 
year afterwards. 
The clause contains two prohibitions, in its initial and current 
form. First, it prohibits the simultaneous holding of 
incompatible offices. Second, the original version flatly 
prohibited the appointment of a member of Congress to 
office during his term of office (plus one year for Senators), 
regardless of whether he would resign to accept the office. 
This is the ineligibility clause. 
The incompatibility clause was widely accepted in 
the Convention, and was not debated at great length. Its 
prohibition is absolute. According to Hamilton [in t~e debates] 
this clause provLded "that when a m(?mber tal<.es his seat, he 
should vacate every other office." l Farrand, Records of the 
Convention of 1787, at 381-382. 
The ineligibility clause, however, was hotly contested, 
and was ultimately changed to permit a member to accept another 
office during his term if he re signed and if the office was not 
one with respect to which the emoluments were increased during 
the member's term i.n office, or one created during such term. 
( 
USDC concluded that the incompatibility clause was intended 
to declare an incompatibility of legislative and executive or 
judicial offices. It was not a standing qualification for 
membership in Congress. It was designed to protect the 
integrity of a three-branch government, and the separation 
of those branches. 
(2) USDC concluded that a commission in the 
Reserve was an "office under the United States." The Reserve 
'1-..._ 
is divided into Ready, Standby, and Retired components. Most 
Congressmen and Senators are classified in either Standby or 
Retired Reserves. Standby Reservists receive no pay, but 
can participate in training, earn promotions, and earn 
retirement credits. Retired Re s ervists can receive pay, though 
less than twenty Congressmen in this component do so. All 
Reservists are subjectm call to active duty without their 
consent in time of war. 
USDC relied on United St ~tes v. Har~well, 6 Wall. 385, 
393 (1867)(0ffice means "a public station, or employment, -conferred by the appointment of Government. The term embraces 
the ideas of tenurE~, duration, emoluments, and duties,") for 
some authority that a Reserve commi. ssion was an office under 
the United States. Direct authority, however, was provided by 
the House Report cited supra. In 1916, after the militia of 
the several states was federalized as the National Guard, the 
House Committee on the Judici.ary considered at length whether 
a commission in the 1916 National Guard was an office under 
The Committee concluded that a Congressman 
I 
the United States. 
was not entitled to hold a commission in the Guard. 




distinguished. Indeed, Reserve officers are appointed by the 
President and retain their commissions at his pleasure; Guard 
officers in 1916 were not appointed by the President, and 
the commissions were for definite terms. 
The government relied on 5 USC§ 2105(d), enacted in 
1930, which provided: 
A Reserve of the armed forces who is not on active 
duty or who is on active duty for training is 
deemed not an employee or an individual holding 
an office of trust or profit ••• under ••• 
the United States because of his appointment, 
oath, or status, or any duties or functions 
performed or pay or allowances received in that 
capacity. 
While admitting that there was some indication in the floor 
debates on this bill that it would remove a Reserve officer 
from the defi.ni tion of "office" under the Constitution, the 
USDC concluded, citing the views of the Military Affairs 
Committee (Sen. Reed), that the bill should not be understood 
to reach this situation. Rather, the narrow purpose of the bill, 
as explained in the House Report, was to "remedy a situation 
occasioned by a ruling of the Attorney General that prevents 
Reserve Officers, who are attorneys at law, from practicing 
before the Treasury Department or from performing other work 
that the law forbids officers of the Government to undertake." 
H.R. Rep. No. 1884, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1930). To like 
effect, in the USDC's view, was Sj_mmons v. Uni.Ced States, 55 
Ct. Cl. 56 (1920), a decision~rendered before the above bill
5 
which permitted Reserve officers to prosecute claims against 
the United States in the Court of Claims despite a statute 
(now 13 USC§ 205) which barred officers of the United States 
from doing so. Both the 1930 Act and the 1920 decision, 
( 
in the USDC's view, were of limited scope and related to 
specific problems not involving Congressmen. And in any 
event those cases dealt with the relationship between the 
Executive Branch and a private citizen. The compatibility 
clause relates to the relationship between the Executive 
Branch and the Legislative Branch. The potential conflict 
in the latter instance is not inconsequential, and in view 
of that the Framers erected an inflexible barrier. 
In light of the exhaustive and well-written opinion 
of the USDC, D .c. , the CADC affirmed wi_ thout opinion, relying 
on the district court's opinion alone. CADC added, "We are 
also of the view that plaintiffs have the requisite standing 
and that their claim is judicially enforceable under the 
rationale of Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), and Bak~. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)." 
3. Contentions. 
a. SG asserts that respondents did not have standing. 
He argue s, correctly, that no "injury in fact" has been shown, ,. ....._ : 
and that this Court has never grantc~d standing without such a 
showing. Sierra Club v. Morton, tf O '.:i U.S. 7 27. SG also cites 
Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, a case in which th.Ls Co11rt dismissed 
an action for lack of standing. The action sought to challenge 
the qualifications of a Justice of the Court under the ineligi_bility 
provision of Art. I, § 6, Cl. 2. Under that decision, one would 
have to show, in order to have standing, "that he has sustained 
or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as a 
that action and it is not :, uffi_ ci_ent that he has merely 
interest common to all m0mL)ers of the public." 
.J 
This case, of course, arose under a different provision of the 
same clause involved here. Insofar as the CADC indicated that 
Flast would support standing as a taxpayer, SG agrees with 
the USDC analysis on this point, supra. 
b. SG next argues, in conclusory fashion, that 
the incompatibility clause provides a qualification of office, 
and qualifications, under Art. I, §5, Cl. 1, rest within the 
exclusive authority of each House. SG further notes that this 
precise question was left open in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 
486, 520 n.41. If, as the SG argues, this is a qualification, 
the question presented here is not a proper subject for 
judicial scrutiny. Baker v. Carr, 369 US, at 217. 
c. Finally, on the merits SG contends that 
commi ~sions in the Standby or Retired Reserves are not offices 
under the United States, even under the standard enunciated in 
Hartwell, supra. Such Reservists have no duties of a permanent 
nature; they are not subject to discipline; they receive no 
emoluments; and the retirement pay is independent of their 
Reserve Status and is in the nature of a pension. Moreover, 
the commissions are for an indefinite term and are held during 
the pleasure of the President, Such a commission is v~stly 
different from a commission in the Regular Army or service in 
the Cabinet. With its intermittent, noncontinuous duties and 
its limited relationship with the executive branch, such a 
commission seems neither inherently repugnant to the congressional 
office nor an encroachme nt on the independence of the legislative 
branch. 




\, . ... 
ground for standing under Flast. There is a logical nexus 
be~ween the status of citizen and the claim sought to be 
adjudicated. And injury in fact results from the potential 
for undue influence created by violarion of the clause, a 
precise self-operative provision of the Constitution, which 
presented a narrow issue, not a generalized grievance about the 
conduct of government. The fact that the injury is shared 
by all citizens does not mean that Lt ts less deserving of 
legal protection through the judicial process. In other 
respects the response tracks the dist.:rict court's decision, 
discussed above. 
d. There is an amicus brrief in support of 
petr SG by the Reserve Officers Association, a federally 
chartered corporation committed, i.n i. ts words, to "the support 
of a military policy for the United States that will provide 
adequate national security, and to promote the development 
and execution thereof. *** The Association's aim is to 
keep America strong in a perilous worJd," Arnicus adds nothing. 
4. Discussion. Thi.,,_s Cti :-:.. r c"J early presents 
substantial questions. Regardless of one's views about the 
I 
de~ionbelo;:"" it is ~lear that tD affirm it Ex Parte .Levitt 
would probably have to be overrulerl. The justiciability 
question was left open in Powel 1. And tl1P question on the 
merits is one of first impression. 
The only way to avoid grilnti n0 thts case, as I see it, 
would be to hold it for No. 72 °~~~'.) . ll.!2.it" cd States v, Richardson, 





could bear on this case. However, in Richardson the plaj_ nti. ff s 
sought standing as taxpayers under Flast, and the resolution of 
that standing issue would not necessarily resolve the standj_ng 
issue presented here. 
There is a response. 
Apri 1 6, l 97 3 Bezanson Op. CADC and USDC 
in Petn Appx. 
• 
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CHAM BERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
~ltpn"tnt QJourt of t1rt 'JU1tittb $;t~iua 
~nalrington, 1fl. QJ. 2llffe>!-~ 
May 22, 1974 
72-1188, Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop 
the War 
Dear Chief, 
I shall probably write a brief con-
curring opinion in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 




















June 3, 1974 
Ko. 72-1188 Schlesinger v. Reservists 
Dear Chief: 
I em prepared to join your fine opinion for the Court 
in the above case. 
I do have a bit of a nroblem with one sentence on page 
15, as marked on the enclosed draft. The sentence is a 
flat holding that the decision rests on the requirements of 
Article III. This sentence is not entirely consistent with 
my reading of the precedents, especially Baker v. Carr, as 
I have indicated in my concurring opinion in United States 
v. Richardson. While Article III undoubtedly hovers {n the 
background, our more recent cases have addressed and turned 
on prudential rather than constitutional barriers. 
I believe this one sentence could be eliminated without 
other changes in your fine opinion or without diluting its 
force. 
Sincerely, 











~Utttmtt ~cud cf tlrt ~nitdt ~tatts-
~as-fringtcn. 18. ~. 20~}~.;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
June 4, 1974 
Re: No. 72-1188 - Schlesinger v. Reservists 
Committee to Stop the War 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 0~ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to Conference 






CHAM BERS OF 
JU S TI CE W I L LIAM H . REHNQUI ST 
~n.µnme ~o-nrf .cf ffye 'Ja.ttileh ~frurg 
~a:tt!rmgton, tB. ~. 2.offe)l-~ 
June 6, 1974 
Re: No. 72-1188 - Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee 
Dear Chief: 




The Chief Just ice 
Copies to the Conference 
June 12, 1974 
No. 72-1188 Schlesinger v. Reservists 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
The Chief Justice 




















~uprtmt <qcu:rt cf tqt 'Jllnittb ~tau a 
'maaqingfott, 1I}. <q. 20ffeJ1;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 13, 1974 
Re: No. 7 2-1188 - - James R. Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee 
to Stop the War et al. 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
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C HA.Mee-RS Of'" 
JU~,1 •C E HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
Dear Chief: 
~tuU ~omf ctf tJft ~b •tatt• 
... Jriqton. ~- ~- 2.0,4, 
June 17, 1974 
Re: No. 72-1188 - Schlesinger v. Reservists 
Committee 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
/I.(,£. tl. 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
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To: Mr . Justice Douglas 
Mr . Justice Brennan 
.Mr . Justice Stewart 
.Mr . Justice White 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
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Mr. Justice Powell 
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2nd DRAFT 
From: '.J.'he l,h.un Justice 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA<f~ulated: 
--:-:-:-:-:----:----
Rec i r o u la tad: JUN 6 197 4 No. 72-1188 
James R. Schlesinger, Secre-
tary of Defense, et al., 
Petitioners, 
v. 
Reservists Committee to Stop 
the War et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to 
the United States Court 
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the Court. 
We granted certiorari, 411 U. S. 947 (1973), to review 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming, without 
opinion, the District Court's partial summary judgment 
for respondents declaring that "Article I, Section 6, 
Clause 2 of the United States Constitution renders a 
Member of Congress ineligible to hold a commission in the 
Armed Forces Reserve during his continuance in office." 
323 F. Supp. 833, 843 (D. D. C. 1971). We hold that 
respondents do not have standing to sue as citizens or 
taxpayers. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
therefore reversed. 
I 
Article I, § 6, cl. 2, of the Federal Constitution provides: 
"No Senator or Representative shall, during the 
time for which he was elected, be appointed to any 
civil office under the authority of the United States, 
which shall have been created, or the Emoluments 
whereof shall have been increased during such time; 
and no person holding any office under the United 
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States, shall be a Member of either House during his 
continuance in office." 
The Constitution thereby makes Members of Congress 
ineligible for appointment to certain offices through the 
limitation of the Ineligibility Clause, and prohibits Mem-
bers of Congress from holding other offices through the 
latter limitation, the Incompatibility Clause. 
Respondents, the Reservists Committee to Stop the 
War and certain named members thereof ,1 challenged th~ 
Reserve membership of Members of Congress 2 as being 
1 The Committee, located in California, is a national unincorpo.-
rated association of present and former officers and enlisted merrt• 
hers of the Reserves, organized for the purpose of opposing the 
military involvement of the United States in Vietnam and of using 
all lawful means to end that involvement, including efforts by its 
members individually to take all steps necessary and appropriate 
to end that involvement. The five individual respondents were 
all members of the Committee, residents of California, and United 
States citizens and taxpayers. At the time suit was filed, four of 
the individuals were in active Ready Reserve status; the status of 
the fifth, then the Committee cochairman, was unspecified. 
2 At the time suit was filed, 130 Members of the 91st Congress 
were also members of the Reserves, which are divided into Ready, 
Standby, and Retired components. By the end of the 92d Congress, 
119 Members were Reservists. The 93d Congress has seen the 
number of its Reservists reduced to 107, all but one of whom is 
a commissioned officer, App., at 5, and none of whom can occupy 
the Ready Reserve status of the individual Respondents, supra, n. 1. 
Dept. of Defense Dir. 1200.7 § v, c. 2 (July 2, 1970), 32 CFR 
§ 125.4 (c) (2). Of the 107, 19 are in the active and 12 in the 
inactive Standby Reserve; and 76 are in the Retired Reserves, 16 
of whom receive retirement pay. One other Member is in the 
Army National Guard, and thus in the Ready Reserve, 10 U. S. C. 
§ 269 ( 6), but since the governors of the various States control 
appointments to offices in the Guard,· Petitioners could not provide 
relief regarding such Reservists. The judgment of the District 
Court did not therefore extend to this category of Reservist. 323 
F. Supp,, at 838 n. 3. 
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in violation of the Incompatibility Clause: They com-
menced a class action in the District Court against peti-
tioners, the Secretary of Defense and the three Service 
Secretaries, seeking ( 1) an order in the nature of manda-
mus directed to petitioners requiring them to strike from 
the rolls of the Reserves all Members of Congress presently 
thereon, to discharge any member of the Reserves who 
subsequently became a Member of Congress, and W 
seek to recla,im from Members and former Members of 
Congress any Reserve pay said Members received whil~ 
serving as Members of Congress, (2) a permanent injunc-
tion preventing petitioners from placing on the rolls of 
the Reserves any Member of Congress while serving in 
Congress, and (3) a declaration that membership in the 
Reserves is an office under the United States prohibited to 
Members of Congress by Art. I,§ 6, cl. 2, and incompatible 
with membership in the Congress. 
Respondents sought the above relief on behalf of 
four classes of persons. The Committee and the indi-
vidual respondents sought to represent the interests of 
( 1) all persons opposed to United States military involve-
ment in Vietnam and purporting to use lawful means, 
including communication with and persuasion of Mem• 
bers of Congress, to end that involvement. The individ-
ual respondents alone sought to represent the interests 
of (2) all officers and enlisted members of the Reserves 
who were not Members of Congress, (3) all taxpayers of 
the United States, and ( 4) all citizens of the United 
States. The interests of these four classes were alleged 
to be adversely affected by the Reserve membership of 
Members of Congress in various ways . 
. As relevant here, citizens and taxpayers were alleged 
in respondents' complaint to have suffered injury because . 
Members of Congress holding a Reserve position in the 
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of undue influence by the Executive Branch,3 in violation 
of the concept of the independence of Congress implicit in 
Art. I of the Constitution. Reserve membership was also 
said to place upon Members of Congress possible incon-
sistent obligations which might cause them to violate their 
duty faithfully to perform as Reservists or as Members 
of Congress. Reserve membership by Members of Con-
gress thus, according to respondents' complaint, 
"deprives or may deprive the individual named 
plaintiffs and all other citizens and taxpayers of 
the United States of the faithful discharge by mem-
bers of Congress who are members of the Reserves of 
their duties as members of Congress, to which all 
citizens and taxpayers are entitled." Petn. app., at 
46. 
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss Respondents' com-
plaint on the ground that respondents lacked standing 
to bring the action, and because the complaint failed to 
state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted. 
The latter ground was based upon the contention that 
the Incompatibility Clause sets forth a qualification for 
Membership in the Congress, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 5, 
cl. 1, not a qualification for a position in the Executive 
Branch. The power to judge that qualification was as-
serted to rest exclusively with Congress, not the courts, 
under Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 550 (1969). 
The District Court concluded that it first had to de. 
3 Respondents appear to have had reference in part to pressure 
that conceivably could be applied to Reservist Members of Congress 
through such offices as the President's power to call Reservists to 
active duty without their consent, 10 U. S. C. §§ 672-75, or his 
power to discharge commissioned Reservists, who serve only at hi!$ 
pleasure. 10 U. S. C. § 593. 
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termine whether respondents had standing to bring the 
action and, without citation to authority, stated: 
"In recent years the Supreme Court has greatly ex-
panded the concept of standing and in this Circuit 
the concept has now been almost completely aban-
doned." 323 F. Supp., at 839. 
The court then held that of the four classes respondents 
sought to represent, " [ o] nly their status as citizens" gave 
them standing to sue in this case. Id., at 840, 
The District Court denied standing to respondents as 
Reservists, as opponents of our Vietnam involvement, and 
as taxpayers. The court acknowledged that there were 
very few instances in which the assertion of "merely the 
undifferentiated interest of citizens," id., would be suf-
ficient, but was persuaded to find that interest sufficient 
here by several considerations it found present in the 
nature of the dispute before it and by the asserted aban-
donment of standing limitations by the Court of Appeals, 
whose decisions were binding on the District Court. 
In response to petitioners' contention that the Incom-
patibility Clause sets forth a qualification only for Mem-
bership in the Congress, which Congress alone might 
judge, the District Court characterized the issue as 
whether respondents presented a nonjusticiable "political 
question" resolution of which by the text of the Consti-
tution was committed to the Congress under Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). The court held that the 
failure of the Executive Branch to remove Reservist 
Members of Congress from their Reserve positions was 
justiciable. 
Having resolved the issues of standing and political 
question in favor of respondents, the District Court held 
on the merits that a commission in the Reserves is an 
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the Incompatibility Clause. On the basis of the fore .. 
going, the court in its final order granted partial summary 
.judgment for respondents by declaring that the Incom-
patibility Clause renders a Member of Congress ineligible, 
during his continuance in office, from holding a Reserve 
"commission"; the court denied such parts of respondents' 
motion for summary judgment which sought a permanent 
injunction and relief in the nature of mandamus.4 323 
F . Supp., at 843. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
District Court in an unpublished opinion "on the basis 
of the memorandum opinion of the District Court.'; The 
Court of Appeals added that it was "also of the view that 
[respondents] have the requisite standing and that their 
claim is judicially enforceable under the rationale of'' 
Flast v. Cohen, supra, and Baker v. Carr, supra. Peti-
tioners present three questions for review: ( 1) whether 
respondents have standing, "either as citizens or as 
federal taxpayers," to bring this claim, (2) whether 
respondents' claim presents a "political question" not sub-
ject to judicial review, and (3) whether "membership" in 
the Reserves constitutes an "office under the United 
States" within the meaning of the Incompatibility Clause. 
Petn., at 2. 
II 
A 
In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 95 ( 1968), the Court 
noted that the concept of justiciability, which expresses 
the jurisdictional limitations imposed upon federal courts 
4 Respondrnts did not, in thr Court of Appeals, or by cross. 
pet1t 1011 hrre challrngr the Di1strict Court'8 denial of injunctive 
and mandamus relief. In hght of the ground for our dis11osition 
of the.case, we nred not and do not address ourselves to the validity 
or scope of thr Di:;tnct Court's ruling on the merits of respondents' 
,claim, or the relief it, granted . 
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by the "case or controversy" requirement of Art. III, em-
bodies both the standing and political question doctrines 
upon which petitioners in part rely. Each of these doc-
trines poses a distinct and separate limitation, Powell v. 
McCormack, supra, 395 U.S., at 512; Baker v. Carr, supra, 
369 U. S., at 198, so that either the absence of standing 
or the presence of a political question suffices to prevent 
the power of the federal judiciary from being invoked by 
the complaining party. The more sensitive and com .. 
plex task of determining whether a particular issue pre-
sents a political question causes courts, as did the District 
Court here, to turn initially, although not invariably,5 to 
the question of standing to sue. In light of the District 
Court action we turn to petitioners' contention that re• 
spondents lacked standing to bring the suit. Our con• 
clusion that the District Court erred in holding that 
respondents had standing to sue as United States citizens, 
but was correct in denying respondents' standing as tax-
payers, eliminates the need to consider the other questions 
presented by petitioners. 
The District Court considered standing as to each of 
the four capacities in which respondents brought suit; 
it rejected standing as to three of the four, holding that 
G The lack of a fixed rule as to the proper sequence of judicial 
analysis of contentions involving more than one facet of the concept 
·or justiciability was recently exhibited by the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit , which bypassed a determination on standing 
to rule that a claim was not justiciable because it presented a politi-
cal question : 
"The standing of a party need not come into question if a court 
determines that for other reasons the issue raised before the bench 
is non-justiciable." 
That court thus held m effect that if no justiciable question is pre~ 
sented no one has standing. DaCosta v. Lai.rd, 471 F. 2d 1146, 1152 
(1973) See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 731 (1972); 
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respondents could sue only as citizens. The Court of 
Appeals' judgment of affirmance, based solely upon the 
opinion of the District Court, did not alter the District 
Court's ruling on standing. The standing question pre-
sented in the petition for certiorari is addressed to the 
District Court's holding on citizen standing and seeks to 
add the question whether respondents also had standing 
as taxpayers. 0 Respondents do not contend that the 
District Court erred in denying standing to them in 
the other two capacities in which they sought to pro-
ceed, i.e., as opponents of American military involvement 
in Vietnam, and as Reservists. We therefore proceed to 




'To have standing to sue as a class representative it is 
essential that a plaintiff must be a part of that class, that 
is, he must possess the same interest and suffer the same 
injury shared by all members of the class he represents. 
Indiana Employment Division v. Burney, 409 U. S. 540 
(1973); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31 (1962). In 
granting respondents standing to sue as representatives 
of the class of all United States citizens, the District Court 
therefore necessarily-and correctly--characterized re-
spondents' interest as "undifferentiated" from that of all 
other citizens. 
The only interest all citizeus share in the claim ad-
vanced by respondents 1s one which presents injury in 
6 The Court of Appeals did no more than affirm the judgment of 
the District Court, including the latter's denial of respondents' 
standing as taxpayers. Petitioners may, however, have sought to 
raise the issue of taxpayer standing in this Court because of the 
ambiguous reference in the Court of Appeals' judgment of affirmance 
to Flast v. Cohen, supra, a taxpayer-standing case, 
SCHLESINGElt v. RESERVISTS TO STOP THE WAR § 
the abstract. Respondeu ts seek to have the Judicial 
Branch compel the Executive Branch to act in conform-
ity with the Incompatibility Clause, an interest shared 
by all citizens. The very language of respondents' com-
plaint, supra, p. 4, reveals that it is nothing more than 
a matter of speculation whether the claimed non" 
observance of that Clause deprives citizens of the faith"' 
ful discharge of the legislative duties of Reservist Mem"' 
bers of Congress. And that claimed nonbbservance1 
stahding aloile, would adversely affect only the general~ 
ized interest of all citizens 111 constitutional governance; 
and that is an abstract injury.7 The Court has ptevi..: 
ously declined to treat "generalized grievances" about the 
conduct of Governmeht as a basis for taxpayer standing. 
Flast v. Cohen, supra, 392 U. S., at 106. We consider 
now whether a citizen has standing to sue under such a 
generalized complaint. 
Our analysis begins with Baker v. Carr, supra, where the 
yourt stated that the gist of the inquiry must be whether 
the complaining party has 
"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy as to insure that concrete adverseness 
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which • 
the Court so largely depends for illumination of 
difficult constitutional questions." Id., 369 U.S., at 
204. 
Although dealing with a case of claimed taxpayer stand-. 
ing, Flast v. Cohen, supra, gave further meaning to the 
need for a "personal stake" in noting that it was meant 
7 The generalized nature of respondents ' claim is revealed by the 
scope of relief sought, i. e., removal of all Reservist Members of 
Congress from Reserve status rather than the removal of only those 
Reservist Members who manifested by their actions that they were 
influenced by their Reserve status to ;:ict adversely to respondents' / • 
intPre8L ~(/l«. t? ~ 
•' 
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to assure that the complainant seeking to adjudicate his 
claim was the "proper party" to present the claim "in an 
adversary context and in a form historically viewed as 
capable of judicial resolution." Id., 392 U.S., at 100-101. 
In the circumstances of Flast, the Court held that 
the taxpayer-complainant before it had established a re-
lationship between his status as a taxpayer and his claim 
1
under the taxing and spending clause sufficient to give 
assurance 
"that the questions will be framed with the necessary 
specificity, that the issues will be contested with the 
necessary adverseness and that the litigation will be 
pursued with the necessary vigor to assure that the 
constitutional challenge will be made in a form tra-
ditionally thought to be capable of judicial resolu-
tion." Id., 392 U. S., at 106. 
While Flast noted that the "case or controversy" limita-
tion on the federal judicial power found in Art. III is a 
"blend of constitutional requirements and policy consid-
erations," 392 U. S., at 97, the Court, subsequently, in the 
context of judicial review of regulatory agency action held 
that whatever else the "case or controversy" requirement 
embodied, its essence is a requirement of crinjury in fact." 
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. 
Camp, supra, 397 U. S., at 152. Although we there noted 
that the categories of judicially cognizable injury were 
being broadened, id., 397 U. S., at 154, we have more 
recently stressed that the broadening of categories "is a 
different matter from abandoning the requirement that 
the party seeking review must have suffered an injury." 
Sierra Club v. Morton, supra, n. 9,405 U.S., at 738. And, 
in defining the nature of that injury, we have only 
recently stated flatly : "Abstract injury is not enough." 
O'Shea v. Littleton, -V. S. - (1974) . 
Ex parte Levitt, 302 P. f-;. 633 (1937) , was the only 
72-1188-0PiN!ON 
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other occasion in which the Court faced a question under 
Art. I, § 6, cl. 2, although that challenge was made under 
the Ineligibility Clause, not the Incompatibility Clause 
involved here. There a petition was filed in this Court 
seeking an order to show cause why one of the Justices 
should not be disqualified to serve as an Associate Justice. 
The petition asserted that the appointment and confirma• 
tion of the Justice in August 1937 was unlawful because 
the Act of March 1, 1937, permitting Justices to retire 
at full salary after a period of specified service, thereby 
increased the emoluments of the office and that the stat• 
ute was enacted while the challenged Justice was a Sen-
ator. The appointment of the Justice by the President 
and his confirmation by the Senate were thus said to vio-
late the Ineligibility Clause which provides: 
"No Senator or Representative shall, during the 
time for which he was elected, be appointed to any 
civil office under the authority of the United 
States . . the emoluments whereof shall have been 
jncreased during such time. . " 
The Court held : 
"The motion papers disclose no interest upon the 
part of the petitioner other than that of a citizen 
and a member of the bar of this Court. That is 
insufficient. It is an established principle that to 
entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial 
power to determine the validity of executive or legis-
lative action he must show that he has sustained 
or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct 
1n,1ury as the result of that action and it is not 
sufficient that he has merely the general interest 
common to all members of the public,' ' 1 d., at 634.8 
~ Thr Court rited a numbrr of ra~e~ in 8t1pport of 1b holding, 
nearly :dl of which rontamrd language similar to that quoted 
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The Court has today recognized the continued vitality 
of Levitt/' United States v. Richardson, No. 72-88,5, slip 
op., at 10-13; see also Laird v. Tatum, ,103 U. S. 1, 13 
(1972). We reaffirm Levitt in holding that standing to 
sue may not be predicated upon an interest of the kind 
alleged here which is held i11 common by all members of 
the public, because of the necessarily abstract nature of 
the injury all citizens share. Concrete injury, whether 
actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a 
dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form tradi~ 
tionally capable of judicial resolution. It adds the es~ 
sential dimension of specificity to the dispute by requiring 
that the complaining party have suffered a particular in-
jury caused by the action challenged as unlawful. This 
personal stake 1s what the Court has consistently held 
enables a complainant authoritatively to present to a 
in text. See Mcissachusetts (Frothingham) v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 
447, 488 (1923) (insufficient for a party to show "merely that he 
suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally:"); 
Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U. S. 126, 129-130 ( 1922) ("Plaintiff has 
only the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the gov-
ernment be administered accordmg to law and that public moneys 
not be wasted. Obviously this general right does not entitle a 
private citizen to institute in the federal courts a suit") ; Tyler v . 
. Judges, 179 U. S. 405, 406 (1900) ("even in a proceeding which he 
prosecutes for the benefit of the public ... [the plaintiff] must 
generally aver an injury pecular to himself, as distinguished from 
the great body of his fellow citizens") . See also Giles v. Harris, 
189 U. S. 475, 486 (1903) ("The plaintiff alleges that the whole 
registration scheme of the Alabama Constitution is a fraud upon 
the United States Constitution and asks us to declare it void. But, 
of course, he could not maintain a bill for a mere declaration in 
the air." (Holmes, J.). Cf. Newman v. Frizzell, 238 U. S. 5.37, 
550 (1915) , 
ij Thr Court ha8 also rrrPntly cited with approval two of the 
principal cases relied upon in Levitt. Massachusetts (Frothingham) 
, .. Mellon , supra, n. 8, wa::; U8Pd for 8Upport in 0' Shea v. Littleton, 
11:::ed m Baker v Carr, s·npra. 3(j9 U. S., at 208. . · 
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bourt a complete perspective upon the adverse conse.; 
quences flowing from the specific set of facts undergirding 
his grievance. Such authoritative presentations are an 
integral part of the judicial process, for a court must rely 
on the parties' treatment of the facts and claims before 
it to develop its rules of law. 10 Only concrete injury 
presents the factual context within which a court, aided 
by parties who argue within the context, is capable of 
making decisions. 
Moreover, when a court is a.sked to undertake constitu-
tional adjudication, the most important and delicate of 
its responsibilities, the requirement of concrete injury 
further serves the function of insuring that such adjudi .. 
cation does not take place unnecessarily. This principle 
is particularly applicable here, where respondents seek an 
interpretation of a constitutional provision which has 
never before been construed by the federal courts. First, 
concrete injury removes from the realm of speculation 
whether there is a real need to exercise the power of 
. judicial review in order to protect the interests of the 
complaining party. 
"The desire to obtain [sweeping relief] cannot be 
accepted as a substitute for compliance with the 
general rule that the complainant must present facts 
sufficient to show that his individual need requires 
the remedy for which he asks." McCabe v. Atchi-
son, T. & S. F. R. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 164 (1914). 
Second, the discrete factual context within which the 
concrete injury occurred or is threatened insures the £ram.; 
10 Tins is in sharp eontrast to thr political processes in which 
the Congress can initiate inquiry and action, define issues and objec-
tives and exercise virtually unlimited power by way of hearings and 
reports, thus making a record for plenary consideration and solu-
tions. The legislative function is mherently general rather than 
particular and is not intended to be responsive to adversaries assert .. 
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ing of relief no more broad than required by the precise 
facts to which the court's ruling would be applied. This 
is especially important when the relief sought produces a 
confrontation with one of the coordinate branches of the 
government; here the relief sought would, in practical 
effect, bring about conflict with both coordinate branches. 
To permit a complainant who has no concrete injury 
to require a court to rule on important constitutional is-
sues in the abstract would create the potential for abuse 
of the judicial process, distort the role of the Judiciary 
in its relationship to the Executive and the Legislature 
and open the Judiciary to an arguable charge of pro-~ • . 
viding "government by injunction." ~ ~l ~ 
"The powers of the federal judiciary will be ade-
quate for the great burdens placed upon them only 
if they are employed prudently, with recognition 
of the strengths as well as hazards that go with 
our kind of representative government." Flast v. 
Cohen, supra, 392 U. S., at 131 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) . 11 
Our conclusion that there is no citizen standing here, 
apart from being in accord with all other federal courts 
of appeals that have considered the question, until the 
Court of Appeals' holding now under review, 12 is also 
n We bav<' <'xpre~;;ed apprehrm,ion about claim;; of 8tandmg ba;;ed 
on "mere 'interest in a problem.'" See, e. g., Sierra Club, supra, 
405 U. S., at 739. Earlier cases of the Court evidenced comparable 
concern~. See, e g., Newman v. Frizzell, supra, n. 8, 238 U. S., 
at 552. 
12 Lamm v. Volpe, 449 F. 2d 1202, 1204 (CAlO 1971); Pietsch v, 
President of United States, 434 F. 2d 861, 863 (CA2 1970) (Clark, 
Assoc. Justice) ; Troutman v. Shriver, 417 F. 2d 171, 174 (CA5 
1969) (citing Levitt, supra); Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F. 2d 236, 239 
(CAlO 1969); Pauling v. McElroy, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 278 
F . 2d 252, 254 (1960) , cf Sharrow v. Brown, 447 F 2d 94, 97 (CAZ 
1971) . And aside from the decision under review, the only other 
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consistent with the recent holdings of this Court. It is 
one thing for a court to hear an individual's complaint 
that certain specific government action will cause that 
person private competitive injury, Data Processin(/J 
supra, or a complaint that individual enjoyment of 
certain natural resources has been impaired by such 
action, United States v. Students Challenging Regulating 
Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973), 
hut it is another matter to allow a citizen to call on the 
courts to resolve abstract questions. 13 The former pro-
vides the setting for a focus~d consideration of a concrete 
mJury. In the latter, althbugh allegations assert an 
arguable conflict with some limitation of the Constitu- , 
tion, it can be only a matter of sptlculation whether the 
claimed violation has caused concrete injury to the par-
ticular complainant. 
Finally, the several considerations advanced by the · 
District Court in support of respondents' standing as 
citizens do not militate against our conclusion that it was 
error to grant standing to respondents as citizens. First, 
the District Court acknowledged that any injury result-
ing from the Reservist status of Members of Congress 
was hypothetical, but stressed that the Incompatibility 
opinion that appears to have ruled otherwise is Atlee v. Lai.rd, 339 
F . Supp. 1347 (ED Pa.), (1972), which relied upon the dccii,iou 01 
the District Court here. Id., at 1357 n. 8. 
, a Thr Court of Appea'8 reliance on Baker v. Car.r, supra, is 
inapposite. SCRAP pointed out that a personal stake in a fraction 
of a vote in Balcer v Carr was sufficient to support standing. 412 
U. S 689 n. 14. The injury asserted in Balcer was thus a concrete 
injury to fundamental voting rights, as distinguished from the 
abstract injury m nonobservance of the Constitution asserted by 
respondents as citizens 
In Baker v Carr, the Court cited with approval the early case 
of Liverpool Steamship Co v Comm'rs of Emigration, 113 U. S. 
33 (1885), where it was held that a federal court can adjudge rights 
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Clause was designed to prohibit such potential for in" 
jury.1·1 323 F. Supp., at 840. This rational~ 
fails, however, to compensate for the respondents; 
failure to present a claim under that Clause 
which alleges concrete injury. The claims of respond-
ents here, like the claim under the Ineligibility Clause 
in Levitt, supra, would require courts to deal with a diffi-
cult and sensitive issue of constitutional adjudication 
on the complaint of one who does not allege "a personal 
stake in the outcome of the controversy." Baker v. Carr, 
supra, 369 U. S., at 204. To support standing there must 
be concrete injury in a form which assures "the necessary 
specificity" called for by Flast, supra, and "that concret~ 
adverseness ... upon which the court so largely depends 
for the illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 
Baker v. Carr, supra, at 204. Standing was thus found 
by premature evaluation of the merits of respondents 
complaint.15 
14 The Distric1, Court made analogy to conflict-of-interest statutes 
which, it said, are directed at avoiding circumstances of potential, 
not actual, impropriety. Wo have no doubt that if the Congress 
enacted a statute C'reating such a legal right, the requisite injury 
for standing would be found in an invasion of that right. O'Shea v. 
Littleton, supra, 42 U. S. L. W., at 4141 n. 2; Linda R. S. v. 
Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 616 n. 4 (1973); Association of Data 
Procelffling Service Organization v, Camp, supra, 397 U. S., at 154. 
But to satisfy the Art. III prerequisite the complaining party would 
still be required to allege a specific invasion of that right suffered 
by him. Standing could no1-as i1 is not here-be found in a citizen 
who alleged no more than the right of all other citizens to havP-
government conducted without what he perceived, without himself 
having suffered concrete harm, to be proscribed conflicts of interest. 
15 Looking "to the substantive i~ ·ues" which Flast i-;tated to be 
both "appropriate and necessary" in relation to taxpayer standing 
was for the express purpose of determining "whether there is a 
logical nexus between the [taxpayer] status asserted and the claim 
JlOught to be adjudicated." This step is not appropriate on a claim 
of citizen standing since the Flast nexus test is not applicable where 
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The District Court next acknowledged this Court's 
long-standing reluctance to entertain "generalized griev .. 
ances about the conduct of Goverment," Flast v. Cohen, 
supra, 392 U. S., at 106, but distinguished respondents' 
complaint from such grievances by characterizing the 
Incompatibility Clause as "precise and self-operative." 
323 F. Supp., at 840. Even accepting that characteriza-
tion of the Clause it is not an adequate substitute for 
the judicially cognizable injury not present here. More-
over that characterization rested, as did the preceding 
characterization, on an interpretation of the Clause by 
way of the Court's preliminary appraisal of the merits 
of respondents' claim before standing was found. In any 
event, the Ineligibility Clause inyolved in Levitt, supra, 
is no less specific or less "precise and self-operative" than 
the Incompatibility Clause. . 
The District Court further relied on the fact that the 
adverse parties sharply conflicted in their interests and 
views and were supported by able briefs and arguments. 
323 F. Supp., at 840. We have no doubt about the sin-
cerity of respondents' stated objectives and the depth of 
their commitment to them. But the essence of standing 
"is not a question of motivation but of possession 
of the requisite . .. interest that is, or is threatened 
to be, injured by the unconstitutional conduct." 
Doremus v. Board of Education, supra, 342 U. S., 
at 435, 
l 
This same theme as to the inadequacy of motivation to 
support standing is suggested in the Court's opinion in 
Sierra Club, supra: 
"But a mere 'interest in a problem,' no matter how 
longstanding the interest and no matter how quali-
the taxing and spending power is not challenged. Hence there was 
no occasion for the District Court or the Court of Appeals to reacli 
or evaluate what it saw as the merits of respondents' complaint, 
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fled the organization is in evaluating the problem, 
is not sufficient by itself to render the organization 
'adversely affected' or 'aggrieved' within the mean• 
ing of the AP A." 405 U. S., at 739. 
Respondents' motivation has indeed brought them 
sharply into conflict with petitioners, but as the Court 
has noted, motivation is not a substitute for the actual 
injury needed by the courts and adversaries to focus 
litigation efforts and judicial decision-making. Moreover, 
the evaluation of the quality of the presentation on the 
merits was a retrospective judgment that could have 
properly been arrived at only after standing had been 
found so as to permit the court to consider the merits. 
A logical corollary to this approach would be the mani .. 
festly untenable view that the inadequacy of the presen-
tation on the merits would be an appropriate basis for 
· denying standing, · 
Furthermore, to have reached the conclusion that re-
spondents' interests as citizens were meant to be pro-
tected by the Incompatibility Clause because the primary 
purpose of the Clause was to insure independence of each 
of the branches of the Federal Government, similarly in-
volved an appraisal of the merits before the issue of stand-
ing was resolved. All citizens, of course, share equally 
an interest in the independence of each branch of govern-
ment. In some fashion, every provision of the Consti-
tution was meant to serve the interests of all. Such a 
generalized interest, however, is too abstract to consti.,. 
tute a "case or controversy" appropriate for judicial reso .. 
]ution. 1" The proposition that all constitutional pro., 
~n SatI~fact10n of the Data Processing "zone of interest" require-
ment seemingly relied upon to find citizen standing does not support 
such standing for two reasons: first, that case involved judicial 
review under the Administrative Procedure Act of regulatory agency 
.action alleged to have caused private competitive injury; seconq, 
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visions are enforceable by any citizen simply because 
citizens are the ultimate beneficiaries of those provisions 
has no boundaries. 
Closely linked to the idea that generalized citizen inter .. 
est is a sufficient basis for standing was the District 
Court's observation that it was not irrelevant that if 
respondents could not obtain judicial review of petition-
ers' action, "then as a practical matter no one can." Our 
system of government leaves many crucial decisions to the 
political processes. The assumption that if respondents 
have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is 
not a reason to find standing. See United States v. Rich• 
ardson, No. 72-885, decided today, slip op., at 14-15. 
C 
Taxpayer Standing 
Consideration of whether respondents have standing to 
sue as taxpayers raises a different question from whether 
they may sue as citizens. Flast v. Cohen, supra, estab-
lished that status as a taxpayer can, under certain limited 
circumstances, supply the personal stake essential to 
standing. There, the Court held that, in order to ensure 
the necessary personal stake, there must be "a logical 
. nexus between the [taxpayer] status asserted and the 
claim sought to be adjudicated," 392 U. S., at 102. In 
Flast, the Court determined that the taxpayer demon-
strated such a "logical nexus" because, ( 1) he challenged 
the exercise of "Congressional power under the taxing 
and spending clause of Art. I, § 8 ... " and (2) "the 
challenged enactment exceed[ed] specific constitutional 
· limitations imposed upon the exercise of the Congres .. 
Data Proce,;sing required a showing of injury in fact, in addition 
to the "zone of interest" requirement. Until a judicially cognizable 
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sional taxi':qg and spending power" under Art. I, § 8. Id., 
at 102-103. 
Here, the District Court, applying the Flast holding, 
denied respondents' standing as taxpayers for failure to 
satisfy the nexus test. We agree with that conclusion 
since respondents did not challenge an enactment under 
Art. I, § 8, but rather the action of the Executive Branch 
in permitting Members of Congress to maintain their 
Reserve status.11 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
reversed, and the case is remanded to the District Court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
17 As noted earl1rr, supra, p. 3, respondents requested the District 
Court to compel petitioner· to seek to reclaim Reserve pay received 
by Reservist Members of Congress. Such reliPf would follow from 
the invalidity of Executive act10n in paying persons who could not 
lawfully have been Resnvists, not from the invaliclity of the stat~ 
utes authorizing pay to those who 14wfully were Reservists, 
